Summary:
In this episode, we investigate the suspected sabotage of undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea, allegedly by the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3. Analysis of the incident, focusing on the ship's unusual movements and AIS malfunctions, suggests deliberate actions. The incident is framed within a broader context of China's potential strategies regarding Taiwan, where similar undersea cables are crucial for communication and economic activity. Concerns are raised about China potentially testing covert sabotage tactics as a form of "gray zone" warfare, and the vulnerability of Taiwan's infrastructure is highlighted. The potential consequences of severing Taiwan's undersea cables, including significant economic and military disruption, are also explored.
Questions to consider as you read/listen:
What strategic goals might China pursue through undersea cable disruption?
How vulnerable are global undersea cables to deliberate sabotage attempts?
What are the consequences of severing Taiwan's undersea cable network?
Long format:
From Baltic Sabotage to Taiwan’s Lifelines: Is China Testing Its Next Move?
By Justin James McShane
TL;DR:
A Chinese bulk carrier, Yi Peng 3, is suspected of deliberately cutting two critical undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea. Evidence from ship movements, AIS (Automatic Identification System) malfunctions, and interactions with a Danish warship suggests the incident may have been intentional rather than accidental.
The video from What is Going on With Shipping? explores how these actions align with potential Chinese strategic interests, such as testing covert sabotage tactics in preparation for possible operations around Taiwan, where undersea cables are vital. The Baltic incident serves as a case study in "gray-zone" activities, emphasizing the global need to secure vital communication infrastructure against such threats.
Introduction:
The YouTube video from What is Going on With Shipping? is a must-watch for anyone interested in global maritime security and the increasingly complex geopolitical dynamics surrounding undersea cable infrastructure. This video provides an in-depth analysis of the alleged sabotage of undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea by the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3. The cables in question, which connected critical European nations, were severed in what appears to be a deliberate act. Through meticulous examination of ship behavior, including AIS shutoff/malfunctions, unusual speed patterns, and interactions with military vessels, the video builds a compelling case for further scrutiny. The insights provided highlight not only the potential motivations behind such actions but also their implications for global infrastructure security, especially in light of similar vulnerabilities in areas like Taiwan.
I highly, highly recommend this YouTube video from What is Going on With Shipping?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiGuJyrELEk
Background
The Chinese Bulk Carrier Yi Peng 3 was accused of cutting two undersea fiber-optic data telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea. These cables were:
C-Lion1 - Connecting Finland and Germany.
BCS (Baltic Sea Cable) - Connecting Sweden and Lithuania.
The C-Lion1 breakage point and the BCS East-West Interlink are 97–105 kilometers or 60–65 miles apart from each other
Discussion about YouTube video from What is Going on With Shipping?
The analysis presented in the YouTube video employs a comprehensive data-driven approach to elucidate the events surrounding the incident. The depth of the ship, as highlighted by the analysis, significantly diminishes the plausibility of anchor dragging being a legitimate cause, as typically offered as an excuse. Moreover, the vessel's disappearance, specifically the deactivation or malfunction of its Automatic Identification System (AIS) for a period of 7.5 hours, raises substantial concerns. The AIS, a critical maritime navigation safety system, broadcasts essential information such as the ship's position, which is vital for collision avoidance and navigation safety.
Furthermore, the analysis points out an unusual reduction in the ship's speed prior to the AIS going offline, suggesting a deliberate slowing down which could facilitate covert activities. This deceleration, followed by an abrupt increase in speed, might indicate an attempt to mask illicit actions by quickly resuming a normal travel pace, thereby suggesting potential "monkey business" during the period of reduced speed.
The video also discusses the ship's peculiar behavior upon the sighting of a Danish warship: it stopped, drifted, then altered its course away from the warship. This could imply that the ship was either attempting to recover or adjust something it was dragging, or alternatively, trying to create time to either dispose of evidence or deliberate on its next actions. Such behavior, in a legal context, might be interpreted as indicative of consciousness of guilt.
The convergence of these anomalous activities in the vicinity of the two separate cable severance sites presents a compelling case for further investigation. The alignment of these events in such a manner, especially at the locations of cable disruptions, suggests more than mere coincidence and warrants a detailed examination in a formal investigative or legal setting.
Further, as I note above the two points where the sea cables were severed is about 97–105 kilometers or 60–65 miles apart from each other which is a very long period to accidentally have your anchor out in such deep waters.
The Mystery:
The only major question to me is why would China do this and why these particular lines.
I have written before in EP11: Is China going to invade Taiwan? https://www.geopoliticsunplugged.com/audio/episode-11-is-china-going-to-invade-taiwan/ that for various reasons that China is unlikely to assault directly and invade Taiwan. If anything, it is most likely to attempt to blockade the island. And perhaps maybe sever its communications such as its undersea cables.
Taiwan does have underwater cables that are similar to those that were cut in the Baltic Sea. These cables are vital for Taiwan's connectivity, both domestically within its island groups and internationally. Here's some context. First, Taiwan is an island. No kidding, right? Therefore undersea cables for communication and internet are vital. Taiwan has several domestic submarine cables connecting the main island to its outlying islands like the Matsu Islands and Kinmen. For instance, incidents where these cables have been severed or damaged have occurred, notably involving Chinese vessels in the Matsu area, leading to significant internet disruptions. These cables are crucial for local communication and commerce. Taiwan is also well-connected internationally through numerous undersea cables. These cables link Taiwan with major internet hubs in Asia, the United States, and even Europe, ensuring high-speed data transfer for international communications, business, and technology sectors, including its semiconductor industry.
Some of the more notable examples include the APCN2 (Asia Pacific Cable Network 2) which connects Taiwan to Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The EAC-C2C (EA Cables - City to City) which is part of this extensive network that stretches across Southeast Asia and connects to the US. The TPE (Trans-Pacific Express) links Taiwan, South Korea, China, and the US. The SEA-US connects Taiwan to the US via Guam and the Philippines.
The vulnerability of these cables has been highlighted by incidents where they've been accidentally or possibly intentionally damaged. The case with the Matsu Islands, where internet connectivity was severed by Chinese vessels, underscores the strategic importance and fragility of these connections. This has led to discussions in Taiwan about the need to protect these vital communication links, potentially through satellite backups or more secure cable routes.
These cables are not just for civilian use; they are essential for Taiwan's economic activity, particularly in the tech sector, and for national security, as communication lines are crucial in times of both peace and potential conflict. The strategic importance of Taiwan's undersea cables mirrors the global significance of similar cables, like those in the Baltic Sea, where disruptions can have wide-reaching effects on communications and economic activities.
There have been multiple instances where undersea cables connecting Taiwan to its outlying Matsu Islands were cut or damaged, with suspicions often pointing towards Chinese vessels. These incidents have occurred several times over the past few years, with one report mentioning 27 cuts in five years up to 2023.
Could this cable cutting in a far off place with non-critical information disruption be a probing activity by the Chinese?
Yes, the incidents involving Chinese vessels in the Baltic Sea could indeed serve as a strategic probe for several reasons related to potential future actions against Taiwan. First, it could be an attempt to see if the Danish maritime activities could prevent and/or locate after the fact the perpetrator ship to discover if the use of commercial shipping for sabotage activities would work as a clandestine activity. By observing how quickly European nations, NATO, or other global actors respond to infrastructure damage, China can gauge the response efficiency, which would be crucial information if contemplating similar actions towards Taiwan. This includes both the physical repair time and the diplomatic or military responses. The process of repairing undersea cables involves revealing technical details about the infrastructure, the capabilities of repair vessels, and the technology used to locate and fix the damage. This intelligence could be used to plan more effective disruptions in the future.Such incidents test how international law is applied in cases of sabotage or accidental damage to international infrastructure. It also shows how countries might leverage international forums or bilateral negotiations to address such threats. Observing the economic fallout from cable disruptions in Europe can help China understand the potential economic leverage or chaos that could be caused by similar actions around Taiwan. This includes the impact on stock markets, trade, and communication.
The military responses, if any, to these incidents, like increased naval patrols or joint exercises, would provide insights into how NATO or other alliances might react in a Taiwan Strait scenario. The public perception in Europe and the global media's response can inform China about how such actions might affect international opinion or galvanize support against or in favor of Taiwan in a crisis.
This form of "gray zone" activity allows a nation to push boundaries without crossing into overt warfare, providing valuable data for future strategic planning. However, while these incidents might inform China's broader strategic calculus, any direct comparison or application to the Taiwan situation would need to account for the unique geopolitical, military, and economic factors surrounding Taiwan, including its strategic importance in the semiconductor industry and the U.S.'s explicit interest in ensuring Taiwan's security.
By conducting these operations, China might be gauging the threshold of international tolerance for such actions, testing the resilience of international infrastructure and assessing the effectiveness of their own deniability or the effectiveness of international investigations into such incidents.
This information could be crucial for China's strategic planners in deciding whether attempts to isolate Taiwan through infrastructure disruption would be feasible, effective, and how to manage potential global backlash.
Strategic Modeling for a Taiwan Blockade:
A blockade of Taiwan might involve severing or threatening these cables to isolate the island. Understanding how nations react to such disruptions can inform China's planning for whether such actions would effectively coerce Taiwan or lead to international intervention. The psychological warfare aspect of showing that one can disrupt vital infrastructure at will could be a tactic to intimidate or pressure Taiwan and its allies. By analyzing the costs (operational, diplomatic, economic) versus the strategic gains from such actions in the Baltic Sea, China could estimate what similar actions might yield in the Taiwan Strait, including the potential for escalation.
One can imagine a scenario where Chinese flagged ships which are abundant around Taiwan could be used like the Chinese Bulk Carrier Yi Peng 3 in the Baltic to sever or try to sever all of the cables to and from Taiwan.
General Timeline for Repair
It all depends. It depends on the severity of the cut, where it is (how deep or rough the waters are) and the availability of the specialized crews and materials needed to repair the damage. However, as a general rule, overall, from start to finish, repairing an undersea cable can take anywhere from a week to several months, with an average of about 30 days being commonly cited for straightforward repairs. There are distinct stages of the repair: mobilization and forensic analysis, location and recovery, repair and testing and reinstatement. It can take from a few days to a couple of weeks to mobilize a repair ship. It can also take several weeks to do a forensic analysis to try to discover the root cause of the damage. Finding and retrieving the cable can take several days, especially if it's in deep water. The actual splicing and repair work might take from a few hours to a couple of days. After repair, the cable needs to be tested, which can take additional time.
In Taiwan, particularly with the incidents involving the Matsu Islands, the repair timeline has been documented.Taiwan has faced challenges due to the limited number of cable ships available for repair work. For instance, after the February 2023 incident where both cables connecting Matsu to Taiwan were cut, it took until late April for repairs to begin, indicating a delay of about two months. Once the repair ship arrives, the actual repair process can still take several weeks due to the complexity of the task, the need for precise splicing, and ensuring the repair is robust against the marine environment.
Also the seas in and around Taiwan are notoriously rough during certain times of the year. The Taiwan Strait, also known as the Formosa Strait, experiences rough seas particularly during the cold season, which spans from November to April. This period is marked by frequent storms, which pose significant dangers for shipping. For instance, a storm in November 2007 led to the sinking of four ships due to wind speeds exceeding 115 km/h and wave heights reaching up to 4 meters. Additionally, the strait lies in
Taiwan's strategic location and the importance of its internet connectivity, especially for its tech industry, mean there's an urgency to expedite repairs. However, Taiwan must rely on international cable repair ships, which can lead to delays if these ships are already committed elsewhere. There have been calls for Taiwan to develop its own cable repair capabilities to reduce dependency on foreign ships, which could potentially speed up repair times in the future.
In the case of total severance of Taiwan cables:
If all of Taiwan's undersea cables were to be severed, the consequences would be far-reaching and multifaceted. The immediate effects would be devastating to Taiwan. Taiwan would be cut off from direct internet communication with the rest of the world. This would affect all digital communications, including emails, video calls, financial transactions, and cloud services. Many businesses, especially tech companies and those reliant on cloud computing, would face immediate disruptions. Taiwan's semiconductor industry, which is critical globally, would be severely impacted, potentially causing a ripple effect across global technology manufacturing. Taiwan's stock exchange could see significant disruptions or might have to halt trading due to inability to connect with global markets. International shipping and logistics would be affected, as many systems rely on real-time data and communication. The military would lose direct communication lines with allies, complicating any strategic coordination or response to threats. Satellite communications could remain functional but are typically slower, less secure, and have lower bandwidth compared to fiber optic cables. Internal communication within Taiwan would also be impacted if the severed cables included those linking different parts of the island or its outlying areas, though local networks might still function.
The medium to long-term effects are difficult to fully comprehend as it depends on whether an invasion or a blockade happens as oil would be unlikely that China would simply sever the cables and then walk away. But it useful to consider it anyway. Taiwan would have to rely heavily on satellite communications, which are not as robust, secure, or high-capacity as undersea cables. This might lead to overcrowding on existing satellite services and could slow down communications significantly. Taiwan's role in the global supply chain, especially in semiconductors, would disrupt numerous industries worldwide, potentially leading to a global tech slowdown until connectivity is restored. There would be economic losses due to halted business operations, inability to trade electronically, and disruption in financial markets. Recovery would depend on how quickly cables could be repaired, and the global economy could face a temporary shock. If possible, data traffic might be rerouted through neighboring countries with intact cable infrastructure, but this depends on the capacity of these alternatives and could lead to geopolitical tensions or negotiations. Emergency services could face challenges if they rely on internet-based systems for coordination, although critical services might have backup satellite or radio systems. A sense of isolation or vulnerability might affect the populace and could be leveraged in psychological warfare or influence operations.
Such an event would likely escalate tensions with China, as it would be seen as an act of aggression or an attempt to isolate Taiwan, possibly prompting stronger international responses or military posturing by the U.S. and its allies. There would likely be an immediate push to reinforce or diversify communication infrastructure, possibly through satellite technology, more robust domestic networks, or new cable projects. Taiwan might seek more international cooperation for protection of its infrastructure, and this could affect its diplomatic relations, potentially leading to new alliances or trade agreements focused on infrastructure security. Repairing all undersea cables would take considerable time, resources, and international cooperation, given the complexity and the need for specialized ships and equipment. The recovery would involve not just physical repairs but also restoring confidence in Taiwan's digital infrastructure.
The scenario of all cables being severed would represent a critical infrastructure attack with significant strategic, economic, and societal impacts, pushing Taiwan towards emergency measures and possibly accelerating discussions on infrastructure security.
Conclusion:
The alleged sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea by the Yi Peng 3 raises critical questions about the fragility of global communication networks and the potential for gray-zone tactics in modern geopolitics. This incident is not just a regional concern but serves as a warning for other strategically vulnerable regions, like Taiwan, where undersea cables are essential for both civilian and military communication. By presenting a detailed, evidence-based account, the video underscores the urgent need for international cooperation to safeguard critical infrastructure. It also sheds light on the broader strategic motivations that might drive such covert actions, offering a stark reminder of the interplay between infrastructure security and global power dynamics.
#Geopolitics #GlobalSecurity #MaritimeSecurity #China #Taiwan #UnderseaCables #CriticalInfrastructure #CableSabotage #InternetInfrastructure #DigitalSecurity #BalticSea #TaiwanStrait #AsiaPacific #Europe #GrayZoneWarfare #HybridWarfare #NavalOperations #StrategicPlanning #CyberSecurity #SemiconductorIndustry #TechSupplyChain #GlobalConnectivity #DataSecurity
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https://youtu.be/yiGuJyrELEk?si=v7TgMyo5Oqm1uukK
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